





Taxing Multinationals in the Extractives Industry: Formulary Apportionment for Developing Nations

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Justice and the Tax Base in the 21st Century
University of Melbourne Law School


HOW BIG IS THE PROBLEM?



Global Tax Loss from All Sectors US \$348
Billion


Global Tax Loss from Extractive Sector US \$44 Billion

Mining Sector Contributions in Sub-Saharan Africa




DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXAMPLES


MINERAL PRODUCTION IN AFRICA VS REST



MULTINATIONAL ENTITY (MNE) PROFIT - SHIFTING

Separate Entities for Tax Purposes requires Transfer Pricing at Arm's Length






Capitalisation

OECD TAX REFORMS



OECD BEPS - PILLAR TWO

• Global Minimum Tax at 15% for MNEs with a turnover of more than EUR750 million.




OECD BEPS - PILLAR ONE

- Pillar One aims to **reallocate** certain amounts of MNEs' taxable income to market jurisdictions
- Only affects large MNEs with a turnover > \$20 billion & profitability > 10% of revenue
- **25% of the profits** > 10% of revenue are reallocated based on revenue generation
- The implementation requires a **Multilateral Convention** and the timing is **unknown**
- Negotiations and discussions about these agreements are ongoing as of Jan 2025

Industries, such as Extractives, regulated financial services, and defence, are excluded from Pillar One

"This approach reflects the policy goal of excluding the economic rents generated from location-specific extractive resources that should **only be taxed in the source jurisdiction**, while not undermining the comprehensive scope by limiting the exclusion in respect of profits generated from activities taking place beyond the source jurisdiction, or later in the production and manufacturing chain" [OECD, 2022]



BEPS IN MINING PROGRAMME


To date, the release of three practice notes:

- Limiting the Impact of Excessive Interest Deductions on Mining
- Tax Incentives in Mining: Minimising Risks to Revenue
- Monitoring the Value of Mineral Exports: Policy Options for Governments

The programme will cover the following issues:

- 1. Excessive Interest Deductions
- 2. Abusive Transfer Pricing
- 3. Undervaluation of Mineral Exports
- 4. Tax Incentives
- 5. Tax Stabilisation
- 6. International Tax Treaties
- 7. Offshore Indirect Transfers of Mining Assets
- 8. Metals Streaming
- 9. Abusive Hedging Arrangements
- 10. Inadequate Ring-Fencing


BEPS IN MINING PROGRAMME




Ring-Fencing Rules

"A limitation on consolidation of income and deductions for tax purposes across different activities, or projects, undertaken by the same taxpayer" [International Monetary Fund, 2010)

RING-FENCING



JURISDICTIONS WHERE SOME FORM OF RING-FENCING EXISTS



RING-FENCING BENEFITS & RISKS

Benefits

- **1.Early tax revenues** for local governments reduced losses offset
- 2.Reduce **unrecoverable tax losses** for the government (protects the base)
- 3.Reduce MNE **misuse of non-mining** commercial losses against other projects
- 4. Discourage **expenditure inflation** by MNEs
- 5.Encourage **new entrants** as established MNEs do not gain cash flow advantages

Risks or Challenges

- 1.Increased administrative complexity, risk, and cost e.g., basis of cost allocation
- 2.Discourage **new exploration & development** activities e.g., large initial costs
- 3.Impact on extractive sector **growth**
- **4.Long-term** revenue losses for governments
- 5.Encourage MNE profit-shifting or costshifting to or outside the fence

Domestic Transfer Pricing Abuse in the Context of Ring-Fencing

Mining investors might over-allocate expenditures to mature mining projects or profitable activities to reduce the profits of those projects or activities. Similarly, there might be cases where mining investors will shift profits from profitable projects to loss-making projects or to non-mining activities subject to a lower tax burden. This existing transfer pricing risk can be observed between separate legal entities, but equally, it may be demonstrated where different parts of the same entity are treated as separate taxpayers due to the application of ring-fencing rules.

Where ring-fencing is used and the different parts of the same legal entity are subject to different tax treatment or there is a risk of profit shifting between the ring-fenced activities, the transfer pricing rules should also apply to such internal transactions between separate parts of the same legal entity.

OECD'S APPROACH

- OECD's approach to reforms is central to the Separate Entity Concept & Arm's Length Pricing
- **Pillar One** takes a slightly different approach in reallocating some profits of MNE; however, **extractive industries are not** part of the program
- BEPS mining program aims to increase local tax revenue collection through potential **Ringfencing rules**
- Ring-fencing does not address MNE profit-shifting in extractive industries & rather could encourage MNEs to profit shift
- Tax Scholars argue the need for a more holistic approach in addressing the root cause of MNE profit-shifting Separate Entity Concept
- A Unitary Taxation approach, the Formulary Apportionment method has garnered greater attention in recent times.


THE UNITED NATION'S PERSPECTIVE


- The UN on future global tax reforms new **Tax Convention**
- A paradigm shift in global taxation, initiating a 'Democratised Approach'
- The Tax Convention aims to establish tax reforms aligned with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
- The approach indicates a greater focus on ensuring 'fair taxes' in **global South** countries
- UN "Handbook on Taxation of the Extractive Industries 2021"
- The handbook details potential tax issues in the extractive industries with a comparison to the OECD's approach



TRANSFER PRICING FOR THE EXTRACTIVES INDUSTRY

Diagram of vertically integrated mining operation, including relationship with service provider hubs.b





UN TAX CONVENTION - GLOBAL AGREEMENT

125 Countries voted in favor, 9 countries opposed, and 48 countries' abstentions

	Voting Started			11/27/2024	10):43:21 AM
A/C.2/79/L.8/Re	ev.1 – as a whole	Promotion of in	clusive and effect	tive international	tax cooperation	at the United
	(f)], 26th meetin					
AFGHANISTAN	 CAMEROON	X FINLAND	KUWAIT	■ NEPAL	SAUDI ARABIA	X UKRAINE
XALBANIA	CANADA	X FRANCE	KYRGYZSTAN	XNETHERLANDS (KIN		XUNITED ARAB EMIR
ALGERIA		GABON	TLAO PDR	NEW ZEALAND	X SERBIA	UNITED KINGDOM
ANDORRA	⊞ CHAD	E GAMBIA	XLATVIA	NICARAGUA	#SEYCHELLES	UNITED REP TANZA
ANGOLA	CHILE	X GEORGIA	ELEBANON	NIGER	SIERRA LEONE	UNITED STATES
ANTIGUA-BARBUDA	CHINA	XGERMANY	ELESOTHO	NIGERIA	SINGAPORE	URUGUAY
ARGENTINA	 COLOMBIA	 ⊞ GHANA	LIBERIA		× SLOVAKIA	UZBEKISTAN
× ARMENIA	COMOROS	XGREECE	LIBYA	NORWAY	X SLOVENIA	VANUATU
AUSTRALIA	⊞ CONGO	GRENADA	X LIECHTENSTEIN	TOMAN	SOLOMON ISLANDS	VENEZUELA
XAUSTRIA	COSTA RICA	GUATEMALA	XLITHUANIA	#PAKISTAN	SOMALIA	TVIET NAM
AZERBAIJAN	COTE D'IVOIRE	GUINEA	XLUXEMBOURG	#PALAU	SOUTH AFRICA	YEMEN
BAHAMAS	X CROATIA	#GUINEA-BISSAU	MADAGASCAR	#PANAMA	SOUTH SUDAN	T ZAMBIA
BAHRAIN	+CUBA	T GUYANA	MALAWI	PAPUA NEW GUINEA		#ZIMBABWE
BANGLADESH	XCYPRUS	THAITI	MALAYSIA	PARAGUAY	SRI LANKA	ZIIVIBABVVL
BARBADOS	XCZECHIA	HONDURAS	MALDIVES	#PERU	SUDAN	
BELARUS	DEM PR OF KOREA	XHUNGARY	MALI	PHILIPPINES	SURINAME	
BELGIUM		XICELAND	× MALTA	× POLAND	×SWEDEN	
BELIZE	DENMARK	#INDIA	MARSHALL ISLANDS	X PORTUGAL	SWITZERLAND	
BENIN	DJIBOUTI	INDONESIA	MAURITANIA	- QATAR	SYRIAN ARAB REP	
BHUTAN	DOMINICA	TIRAN (ISLAMIC REP		REP OF KOREA	TAJIKISTAN	
BOLIVIA	DOMINICAN REPUB		MEXICO	REP OF MOLDOVA	#THAILAND	
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVI		XIRELAND	MICRONESIA (FS)	X ROMANIA	TIMOR-LESTE	
BOTSWANA	⊞ EGYPT	SIRELAND	MONACO	RUSSIAN FEDERATI		
BRAZIL	EL SALVADOR	XITALY	™ONGOLIA	RWANDA	⊞ TONGA	
	EQUATORIAL GUINEA		× MONTENEGRO	SAINT KITTS-NEVIS	TRINIDAD-TOBAGO	
BULGARIA	ERITREA	JAPAN	MOROCCO	SAINT LUCIA	TUNISIA	
BURKINA FASO	ESTONIA	JORDAN	MOZAMBIQUE	SAMOA		
BURUNDI	ESWATINI	**KAZAKHSTAN	MYANMAR	SAMOA	TURKMENISTAN	
CABO VERDE CAMBODIA	⊞ ETHIOPIA ⊞ FIJI	⊞ KENYA KIRIBATI	MAMIBIA NAURU	SAN MARINO SAO TOME-PRINCIPE	TUVALU	

THE UN TAX CONVENTION

Tax Convention Timeline 2022 - 2027

May 2022 The African Union publishes a resolution that calls on the UN to begin negotiations for an international convention

on tax matters.

November 2022 Second Committee of the General Assembly

approved draft resolution.

GA resolution 77/244 adopted by the General Assembly.

December 2022

February 2023

The Secretary-General invites written inputs to his report.

May-August 2023

Informal briefings and consultations on the Secretary General's report.

August 2023

The UN Secretary General publishes report advocating for enhancing the UN's role in tax norm shaping and rule-setting.

1

Start of Substantive Sessions to develop a draft terms of reference led by the Ad Hoc Committee, encouraging participation of all Member States.

February 2024

February 2024

Formation of Ad Hoc Committee taking into account gender and geographical balances at the Organizational Session, Call for inputs by the Ad Hoc Committee.

December 2023

General Assembly adopted resolution 78/230, establishing an Ad Hoc Committee to develop draft terms of reference for a Framework Convention.

November 2023

Adoption of a Second Committee resolution calling for a two-step process to negotiate a UN Framework Convention.

October 2023

Opening of Second Committee Discussion began on agenda Item.

September 2023

Opening of 78th Session of General Assembly:

May 2024

First Session of the Ad Hoc Committee to develop draft terms of reference held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

July 2024

The Second Session of the Ad Hoc Committee is held from 29 July to 16 August at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.

August 2024

The Ad Hoc Committee approves the Terms of Reference with 110 votes in favor, incorporating human rights principles into the framework.

November 2024

The United Nations General Assembly approved the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the UN Tax Convention


2025 - 2027

Member State representatives will meet 3 times a year to negotiate a reference text for international tax cooperation, aiming for completion by September 2027.

FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT

• Formulary Apportionment treats MNE as a single global entity and reallocates consolidated profits into jurisdictions based on real economic activity - e.g., Sales, Employees, & Assets







Consolidated Profits = [\$10 + \$2] - \$5 = \$7 Billion









FA EXAMPLE APPLICATION

Countries	Profit/Loss (before tax) \$	Revenue \$	Number of Employees	Tangible Assets \$
Mongolia	-1,188,452, 818	1,666,570,403	4,700	14,155,948,330
Australia	12,797,804,164	35,568,033,654	24,369	31,979,143,059
Singapore	2,241,461,551	13,603,414,178	469	1,111,489,866
Consolidated	13,850,812,897	50,838,018,235	29,538	47,246,581,255

Profit Before Tax = 1/2 * Revenue + 1/2 * Number of Employees + 1/2 * Value of Tangible Assets

				<u> </u>			
Countries	Revenue %	Employees %	Tangible Assets %	PBT - Rev 1/3	PBT - Emp 1/3	PBT - TA 1/3	PBT Reallocated
Mongolia	3%	16%	30%	151,352,312	734,633,586	1,383,319,784	2,269,305,682
Australia	70%	83%	68%	3,230,169,050	3,808,996,992	3,125,003,019	10,164,169,061
Singapore	27%	2%	2%	1,235,416,270	73,307,054	108,614,830	1,417,338,153
Total	100%	100%	100%	4,616,937,632	4,616,937,632	4,616,937,632	13,850,812,897

FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT FOR EXTRACTIVE SECTOR

Benefits

- 1.Recognise **economic activity** in the supply & demand sides
- 2.Focus on **value creation** rather than Permanent Establishment concepts
- 3. The **separate entity concept** is redundant consolidation of profits
- 4.Reduce the **opportunity** for MNE BEPS activities
- 5.Less complex and costly for administration application of the formula

Risks or Challenges

- 1.Requires **global agreement** on what constitutes 'Taxable Presence'
- 2.Determining the most suitable pre-tax profit allocation keys e.g., employees vs sales
- 3. The benefits are theoretically justified However, **empirical evidence** is less
- **4.Unknown** whether FA benefits developing nations

DATA & METHOD

Sample

- 15 firms in the extractive industries from 2018 to 2023
- The sample is driven by the voluntary adoption of **OECD Action 13 or GRI 207** Country-by-Country-Reporting [CbCR]
- 66 CbCRs & 2,866 firm-year-country observations
- Consist of members European Business Tax Forum, B Team Endorsing, and early GRI adopters
- Only CbCRs with reconciliation between PBT and income statement [+/- 10%]

Empirical Analysis

- The **monetary effects** for economies under different Apportionment Formulas
- Four formulas equally weighted and without Sales key (Keys: Sales, Number of Employees, Assets)
- World Bank & United Nations country classifications
- World Bank High Income, Upper Middle Income, Lower Middle Income, & Low Income
- United Nations Developed, In transition, & Developing



SAMPLE DETAILS

MNE	HQ	CbCR Years	Firm-year-country observations	%
AngloAmerican	U.K.	2018-2023	270	9.4%
ВНР	Australia	2020-2023	105	3.7%
ВР	U.K.	2019-2023	370	12.9%
Canacol	Canada	2020-2023	11	0.4%
Eni Group	Italy	2017-2023	490	17.1%
Evraz	U.K.	2020-2021	17	0.6%
Hess	U.S.A.	2020-2023	42	1.5%
Newmont	U.S.A.	2021-2023	28	1.0%
Nordgold	U.K.	2020	4	0.1%
Repsol	Spain	2018-2023	250	8.7%
Rio Tinto	Australia	2018-2023	280	9.8%
Shell	U.K.	2018-2023	582	20.3%
South32	Australia	2020-2023	52	1.8%
Teck Resources	Canada	2019-2022	76	2.6%
Total Energies	France	2019-2022	289	10.1%
Total	15		2,866	100.0%

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

• Four apportionment formulas are used to allocate pre-tax profits to examine differential monetary effects on economies

Equation 1

Profit Before Tax = 1/3 * Revenue + 1/3 * Number of Employees + 1/3 * Value of Tangible Assets

Equation 2

Profit Before Tax = ½ * Revenue + ½ * Number of Employees

Equation 3

Profit Before Tax = $\frac{1}{2}$ * Revenue + $\frac{1}{2}$ * Value of Tangible Assets

Equation 4

Profit Before Tax = $\frac{1}{2}$ * Number of Employees + $\frac{1}{2}$ * Value of Tangible Assets

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

PBT Reallocation under 4 Formulary Apportionment Equations - World Bank Classification

Economy		EQ1	Taxes 15%	EQ2	Taxes 15%	EQ3	Taxes 15%	EQ4	Taxes 15%
	То	194,240		225,046		205,113		177,079	
High Income	From	-142,458		-157,484		-142,722		-151,689	
	Net	51,782	7,767	67,562	10,134	62,391	9,359	25,390	3,809
	То	24,235		19,352		24,317		33,807	
Upper Middle Income	From	-44,687		-50,104		-52,146		-36,582	
	Net	-20,452	-3,068	-30,752	-4,613	-27,830	-4,175	-2,776	-416
	То	27,625		27,658		21,254		34,697	
Lower Middle Income	From	-34,667		-41,428		-34,549		-28,758	
	Net	-7,042	-1,056	-13,770	-2,066	-13,295	-1,994	5,939	891
	То	3,332		2,151		3,894		5,112	
Low Income	From	0		-1,162		0		0	
	Net	3,332	500	990	149	3,894	584	5,112	767

Note: All values are in Euro Millions

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

PBT Reallocation under 4 Formulary Apportionment Equations - The UN Classification

Economy		EQ1	Taxes 15%	EQ2	Taxes 15%	EQ3	Taxes 15%	EQ4	Taxes 15%
	То	174,294		189,001		168,172		168,043	
Developed	From	-105,005		-119,676		-107,145		-90,526	
	Net	69,289	10,393	69,325	10,399	61,026	9,154	77,516	11,627
	То	1,711		1,827		1,099		3,370	
In Transition	From	-12,917		-19,568		-11,199		-9,148	
	Net	-11,206	-1,681	-17,741	-2,661	-10,099	-1,515	-5,778	-867
	То	73,425		83,379		85,306		79,282	
Developing	From	-103,890		-110,934		-111,073		-117,355	
	Net	-30,465	-4,570	-27,554	-4,133	-25,767	-3,865	-38,073	-5,711

Note: All values are in Euro Millions

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

PBT Reallocation under 4 Formulary Apportionment Equations - The UN Reclassification

Economy		EQ1	Taxes 15%	EQ2	Taxes 15%	EQ3	Taxes 15%	EQ4	Taxes 15%
	То	194,414		225,226		205,282		177,253	
Developed	From	(142,456)		(157,482)		(142,720)		(151,687)	
	Net	51,957	7,794	67,744	10,162	62,562	9,384	25,565	3,835
	То	1,711		1,827		1,099		3,370	
In Transition	From	(12,917)		(19,568)		(11,199)		(9,148)	
	Net	(11,206)	(1,681)	(17,741)	(2,661)	(10,099)	(1,515)	(5,778)	(867)
	То	53,306		47,155		48,195		70,072	
Developing	From	(66,439)		(73,127)		(75,498)		(56,194)	
	Net	(13,133)	(1,970)	(25,973)	(3,896)	(27,303)	(4,095)	13,878	2,082

Note: All values are in Euro Millions

CONCLUSION

- High Income and Developed countries benefit in all 4 formulas
- Upper Middle Income & In Transition countries have net losses in all 4 formulas
- Low Income countries (WB classification) have net gains in all 4 formulas
- Tax benefits estimates for Low Income group are approximately between **Euro 150 to 800 million** and significantly low compared to the gains of High Income group (between **Euro 3,800 to 10,200 million**)
- However, **Developing** countries are better off in **Equation 4** in the UN reclassification analysis
- Developing countries have **Euro 13,878 million net gain** of profit distribution and a corresponding **tax of Euro 2,082 million** (applying the global minimum tax of 15%)

Developing countries do not gain the most benefit from the Formulary Apportionment unless the apportionment is through the Number of Employees and Tangible Assets